Companion piece · 2026-10-11
The first indication was the snow.
On December 2, 2001, three men from the village of Lia were collecting firewood in the mountains of western Georgia.
It was early evening. The surrounding forest was covered in snow, and the men were preparing to spend the night outdoors.
Near a forest road, they noticed something unusual.
Two metal cylinders lay on the ground. Each was approximately fifteen centimetres long. The snow immediately surrounding them had melted, exposing the soil beneath.
Steam was rising from the earth.
The cylinders were producing a considerable amount of heat. There were no electrical connections, no visible flames, and no clear markings indicating a radioactive hazard.
The men used wire to move the objects closer to their campsite. They positioned them beside a large rock, near where they would eat and rest.
For several hours, the cylinders provided warmth.
Within hours, all three became ill. Over the following weeks, they developed radiation injuries requiring hospitalization and specialized treatment.
One of the three men would die from complications of his injuries in May 2004.
The incident became known as the Lia radiological accident.
The cylinders had not malfunctioned.
They were producing heat exactly as intended.
One eventually died.
The objects were not ordinary heating equipment. They were radioactive strontium-90 sources, originally manufactured for Soviet industrial power systems.
Their presence in the forest was the result of an equipment disposal failure that had begun years earlier.
The Soviet Infrastructure Behind the Accident
During the early 1980s, Soviet authorities developed a radio-relay communications system between Georgia's Enguri hydroelectric station and the planned Hudoni hydroelectric station.
The system required electrical power in remote mountainous locations where conventional supplies were unavailable.
Eight Beta-M radioisotope thermoelectric generators, or RTGs, were installed in pairs at four relay stations.
An RTG converts heat released by radioactive decay into electricity. Unlike a nuclear reactor, it does not sustain a chain reaction.
The units used strontium-90, a radioactive isotope with a half-life of approximately 29 years. Each generator originally contained a source producing roughly 250 watts of thermal power.
Properly assembled, the generators included substantial radiation shielding.
However, construction of the Hudoni station was suspended, and the communications system became unnecessary. The generators were subsequently abandoned.
Following the Soviet Union's collapse, the equipment was dismantled without adequate regulatory control. The radioactive sources were separated from their protective housings.
Two sources were recovered in 1998 and another two in 1999.
The third pair remained unaccounted for until December 2001.
December 2, 2001: The Discovery
The three men came from Lia, a village in the Tsalenjikha district of Georgia.
The International Atomic Energy Agency later identified them in its investigation as Patients 1-DN, 2-MG, and 3-MB.
That afternoon, they drove approximately 45–50 kilometres east of Lia to collect firewood.
At about 6 p.m., they discovered the cylinders.
Each measured approximately 10 centimetres in diameter and 15 centimetres in length, weighing between eight and ten kilograms.
Patient 3-MB initially picked up one cylinder but dropped it because of its temperature.
Using wire, the men moved both objects beside a large rock near their campsite.
They built a conventional fire and prepared dinner. The radioactive cylinders were positioned behind them as additional heat sources.
Patients 1-DN and 2-MG each spent approximately one to one-and-a-half hours lying near the cylinders, at times with only about ten centimetres separating their backs from the metal.
Neither cylinder carried a clear radiation warning.
After approximately three to three-and-a-half hours of exposure, the men developed nausea, dizziness, headaches, and vomiting.
The symptoms continued throughout the night.
On December 3, exhausted and physically weakened, they loaded only part of the collected firewood and returned to Lia.
The Medical Timeline
Patient 2-MG visited a local medical facility on December 4, complaining of gastrointestinal symptoms and skin irritation.
He did not initially mention the unusual heating objects. The physician suspected intoxication and provided treatment accordingly.
The early symptoms subsequently subsided.
On December 10, Patient 3-MB developed redness, swelling, and burning sensations in his right hand.
By December 15, Patients 1-DN and 2-MG were experiencing burning and itching across their backs.
Their injuries progressed to skin damage associated with severe localized radiation exposure.
On December 22, all three were hospitalized in Zugdidi, where physicians diagnosed acute radiation syndrome.
They were transferred to the Institute of Hematology and Transfusiology in Tbilisi the following day.
The difference in their injuries reflected their exposure patterns.
Patient 3-MB had suffered significant irradiation of his hand while handling the sources. Patients 1-DN and 2-MG had sustained more extensive injuries to their backs.
The localized doses were sufficiently high to damage deeper tissues, despite the relatively limited duration of exposure.
Locating and Recovering the Sources
Georgian authorities attempted to locate the cylinders on December 23, but snow and difficult road conditions prevented access.
A second expedition successfully identified their location on December 29.
On January 4, 2002, Georgia requested assistance from the IAEA.
The recovery operation required specialized equipment, radiation monitoring, and a detailed plan to limit personnel exposure.
A lead-shielded transport container weighing approximately 5.5 tonnes was constructed. Remote handling equipment was prepared, and a team of 24 personnel was assigned specific recovery duties.
Workers were trained to complete individual tasks in short intervals before being replaced.
On February 2, the recovery team reached the location despite severe weather and poor road conditions.
The sources were transferred into the shielded container. The recovery itself required approximately twenty minutes.
The operation was completed without significant radiation injuries to recovery personnel.
Treatment and Long-Term Consequences
Patient 3-MB, whose injuries were less extensive, was discharged from hospital on January 23, 2002.
Patients 1-DN and 2-MG required treatment abroad.
On February 21, Patient 1-DN was transferred to the Burnasyan medical centre in Moscow. Patient 2-MG was transferred to Percy Military Hospital in Paris.
Both required prolonged medical intervention for radiation-induced tissue damage.
Patient 2-MG underwent repeated surgical procedures, including skin grafting and reconstructive surgery. He eventually returned to Georgia in April 2003.
Patient 1-DN experienced persistent injuries, infection, and progressive medical complications. Surgical treatment included removal of damaged tissue and portions of affected ribs.
His condition deteriorated despite continued treatment.
He died on May 13, 2004, 893 days after the original exposure, following multiple-organ impairment.
The incident therefore resulted in three documented cases of radiation injury and one subsequent death.
What Happened Afterwards
The Lia accident became part of a broader effort to locate abandoned radioactive sources throughout Georgia.
By the time the IAEA published its investigation in 2014, six of the original eight strontium-90 sources associated with the relay system had been recovered. Two remained unaccounted for in that report.
Across Georgia, more than 300 abandoned radioactive sources were eventually located and recovered through national and international programmes.
The IAEA identified inadequate control of radioactive equipment, improper abandonment, and the absence of warning labels as central causes of the Lia accident.
It also emphasized the importance of medical personnel recognizing the symptoms of radiation exposure.
The cylinders had operated as designed. Their radioactive decay continued producing heat long after the equipment they once powered had ceased to serve any purpose.
The failure concerned their disposal, security, and identification.
The men encountered two objects that appeared useful and carried no visible explanation of the hazard.
The heat was real. The radiation was also present.
This has been Nuclear Shadows. I'm Morgan Miller.
Listen to Episode 2 — 'The Warmth That Killed': 🎧 https://open.spotify.com/episode/284TE5TfErEMkhMetNfsI2 📺 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PVpk3IBUc3g